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State Corporate Income Taxes:
The Illogical Deduction for Income
Taxes Paid to Other States
RICHARD D. POMP *
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia tax corporations on
their net income.' Forty percent of these jurisdictions allow a corpora-
tion, in calculating its net income, to deduct income taxes paid to other
* RICHARD D. POMP is Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law
School; Director, New York State Legislative Commission on the Modernization
and Simplification of Tax Administration and the Tax Law (New York Tax
Study Commission); and President, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.
This article is based upon a report prepared by the author for the New York Tax
Study Commission. In preparing that report, the author benefited from com-
ments by DR. JAMES BARRESE; GENE CoRIGAN; PETER L FABER; JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN; PROFESSOR WALTER HELLERSTEIN; CAROL KELLERMAN; ROBERT
MCINTYRE; PROFESSOR OLIVER OLDMAN; ROBERT PLATTNER;. MARVIN RosEN-
BLUM; PROFESSOR JAMES SuAREz; and RALPH 0. WINGER. The author is espe-
cially grateful to PROFESSORS MICHAEL J. McINTYRE and LoFTrus E. BECKE., JR.
1 See ALA. CODE § 40-18-2 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.011(e) (1962);
ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1111 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2004
(1980); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 23151 (West 1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-
22-301 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-214 (West 1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 30, § 1902 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1807.1 (1981); FLORIDA
STAT. ANN. § 220.01 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-3601 (1979);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-71 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3025 (1947);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201 (Smith-Hurd 1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-
2.1-1-2 (Burns 1984); IOVA CODE ANN. § 422.33 (West 1971); KANSAS STAT.
ANN. §§ 79-32, 110 (1984); KENTocKY REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (Baldwin
1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:31 (West 1970); MAINE REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 5200 (1964); MD. GEN. CODE ANN. § 288 (1980); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 30 (West 1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.557(l) (Callaghan
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.02 (West 1961); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-13-1
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.071 (Vernon 1976); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 15-
31-403 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734 (1943); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-A:1 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-2 (West 1940); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-2A-1-14 (1978); N.Y. TAX LAW.v § 209 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-1303 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-01 (1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5733.05.1 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2355
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 318.011 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 3420 (Purdon 1963); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-11-2 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-7-230 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-801 (1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-13-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5831 (1981); VA. CODE ANN.
419
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states.2 The thesis of this article is that a deduction for income taxes
paid to a sister state violates normative principles of income taxation
by allowing a cost of generating tax-exempt income.
Tax analysts agree that a properly designed tax on net income should
allow a deduction for the costs of generating that income. Otherwise,
a taxpayer would be partially taxed on its gross income, rather than on
its net income.' Analysts also agree that costs incurred in generating
tax-exempt income should be nondeductible.'
Under the federal corporate income tax, a U.S. corporation is taxable
on all of its worldwide income; consequently, the entire amount of
§ 58.1-400 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 11-24-4 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.01(2)
(West 1969).
State taxes levied on or measured by a corporation's net income are sometimes
called "franchise taxes." Unless the context otherwise requires, "income taxes"
refers to all state taxes levied on or measured by a corporation's net income.
2See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2016 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-304
(1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
30, § 1903 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-1 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 2-203(f) (Smith-Hurd 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.35 (West 1971); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:55 (West 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734.04 (1943);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-4(k) (West 1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2A-2
(1978); N.Y. TAX LAW § 208 (McKinney 1966); OHo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5733.04 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2358 (West Supp.
1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-11-11 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-805
(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5811 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 11-24-6 (1983).
3 See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 86-87 (4th ed.
1985). Under certain conditions, a tax on gross income can serve as an adequate
proxy for a tax on net income. See Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in
Taxing its Nonresident Citizens, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW AND POLITICS 245,
266 (1985).
4 Both federal and state tax law contain numerous provisions denying a de-
duction for costs attributable to generating tax-exempt income. The Internal
Revenue Code, for example, contains a general prohibtion against deducting
amounts allocable to tax-exempt income. See I.R.C. § 265. Because most states
use federal taxable income as the starting point in calculating a corporation's net
income, such prohibitions in the Code are automatically incorporated into state
law. In addition, states have specific statutes denying a deduction in situations
where the Code's prohibitions do not apply because the expense is incurred in
generating income that is taxable for federal purposes but exempt for state pur-
poses. For example, the New York franchise tax requires the disallowance of
federally allowed deductions for interest expenses directly or indirectly attribut-
able to income from subsidiary capital because such income is exempt under state
law but taxable under federal law. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 208(9)(a)(1); 208(9)
(b)(6) (McKinney 1966).
In cases where income is taxable for state purposes, but is exempt for federal
purposes, a state should properly allow a deduction for the relevant expense even
though the Code appropriately denies such a deduction. For an example of
where state law correctly allows a deduction that the Code denies, see N.Y. TAX
LAW § 208(9) (b) (2) (McKinney 1966) and Reg. § 3-2.3(a) (2) (authorizing a
deduction for interest expenses incurred to carry state and municipal bonds).
6 I.R.C. § 61.
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the costs incurred in generating that income, including taxes paid to
state and local governments, is properly deductible.0 State corporate
income taxes, however, differ in a fundamental way from the federal
corporate income tax. A state income tax is imposed only on that part
of a corporation's net income arising from within the state.7 This terri-
torial limitation on state corporate income taxes requires that a deduc-
tion be denied for corporate income taxes paid to other states.
This essential difference between the federal and state corporate
income taxes is easy to blur. In New York, for example, where a pro-
posal to change existing law by denying a deduction for corporate in-
come taxes paid to other states has been under consideration,8 opponents
of the proposal have asserted that such taxes are a cost of doing business
and should therefore remain deductible.' In the context of the federal
corporate income tax, this characterization of state and local income
taxes would be proper and compelling. In the context of a state cor-
porate income tax, however, the relevant question is whether income
taxes paid to sister states are a cost of generating income that is subject
to the jurisdiction of the taxing state. A state income tax may be a cost of
generating income, but not income subject to the jurisdiction of the tax-
ing state. The proper response by a state is to deny a deduction for
these taxes.
The New York experience is telling in yet another respect. If polled,
most New York legislators, like their counterparts elsewhere, would
probably agree that state tax policy should not discriminate against
local, intrastate businesses; to the contrary, many legislators might prefer
to favor these businesses. Yet, by allowing a deduction for income
taxes paid to other states, New York discriminates against such corpora-
tions, taxing them at a higher effective rate than multistate corpora-
tions.
6 I.R.C. § 164; Reg. § 1.164-1(a). For tax years beginning after 1986, sales
taxes paid or accrued in connection with the acquisition or disposition of prop-
erty used in a trade or business or in producing income are added to the basis of
the acquired property or subtracted from the amount realized. I.R.C. § 164(a).
7 The one exception to the discussion in the text is Alabama, which taxes the
worldwide income to corporations incorporated in Alabama. A credit is properly
provided for income taxes paid to other states. ALA. CoDE § 40-18-35 (1985).
Alabama's credit is similar in theory and approach to the federal foreign tax
credit. See I.R.C. §§ 901-04.
8 In 1985, the New York Assembly passed a bill eliminating New York State's
deduction for corporate income taxes paid to other states. 1985 Reg. Sess. As-
sembly Bill A. 8-A, § 1 (amending N.Y. TAx LAw § 208(b) (McKinney 1966)).
The proposal is still under active consideration.
9 See, e.g., Draft Memorandum from the Business Council of New York State
to the author (undated); Lettter from H. Thomas Platt, Director of Taxes, Ag-
way Inc., to the author (June 28, 1984).
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II. ANALYSIS
In determining the amount of income subject to their jurisdiction,
states tend to follow the same general pattern. The states apportion
the income of corporations doing business within their borders through
the use of a formula. 10 The most widely used formula employs three
factors: real and tangible personal property, payroll, and sales." The
formula calculates the average of the ratios of property, payroll, and
sales within the taxing state to their totals everywhere:
In-state property + In-state payroll In-state sales
Total property Total payroll Total sales
3
This average, expressed as a percentage, is the so-called business appor-
tionment percentage. A corporation's net income (as defined by the
taxing state) is multiplied by its business apportionment percentage.
The resulting amount represents that portion of a corporation's net in-
come which is subject to tax by the state.'2
The formula has the effect of apportioning income to the states in
which the corporation has receipts, payroll, or property. 13 Because a
state taxes only income apportioned to it, income that is apportioned
to other states is exempt from taxation. Accordingly, costs incurred in
generating income apportioned to sister states are not properly deduct-
ible in determining a corporation's taxable income. Costs incurred in
generating income that is apportioned to the taxing state are, however,
properly deductible.
In most cases, the correct treatment of a corporation's costs occurs
automatically through the application of the apportionment formula.
As an illustration, consider a corporation that incurs $100 in costs for
10 The description in the text is generally accurate in the case of business in-
come. Nonformulary approaches are more likely to be used in the case of invest-
ment income, such as dividends, interest, or capital gains. For a much more
detailed discussion, see HELLERSTEIN, 1 STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME
AND FRANCHISE TAXES 477-571 (1985). This article is limited to general busi-
ness corporations. Special tax regimes often apply to corporations involved in
banking, insurance, and the like.
11 Id. at 334-35.
12 Id. at 478-79.
13 Federal legislation prevents a state from imposing a naet income tax on the
income of a corporation whose only activity within the state is inter alia, the
solicitation of orders. See Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. §§ 555-56 (1971)
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-384). This article ignores the consequences of
Public Law No. 86-272. For an argument that technological developments have
rendered Public Law No. 86-272 atavistic, see Pomp, State Tax Reform for
the Eighties: The New York Tax Study Commission, 16 CONN. L. REV. 925, 927
n.8 (1984).
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manufacturing activities that occur in States X and Y. Assume that
States X and Y have identical income taxes and that the corporation
apportions 25% of its net income to State X.
Because X is taxing 25 % of the corporation's manufacturing income,
the corporation should only be allowed to deduct 25% of its manu-
facturing costs in determining its net income under X's franchise tax.
This. result is exactly what occurs by applying the 25% business appor-
tionment factor to the corporation's net income. The 25% of the cor-
poration's net income that is allocated to X can be viewed as consisting
of two components: (1) the corporation's gross income, less (2) the
costs that were incurred in generating that income. In effect, by apply-
ing the apportionment percentage to the corporation's net income, the
percentage is applied to the corporation's gross income less its concomi-
tant costs. The result is that X taxes 25% of the corporation's gross
income and allows a deduction for 25% of the corporation's costs. The
other 75% of the corporation's costs is not deductible because X is not
taxing the corporation on 75% of its income.
This same analysis applies if the costs involved are sales taxes, prop-
erty taxes, or other nonincome taxes. For example, only 25% of the
property taxes paid on property used in generating the corporation's
manufacturing income is properly deductible in calculating State X's
franchise tax, a result that is reached automatically through the applica-
tion of the apportionment formula. A different analysis, however, ap-
plies to a net income tax paid to State Y. Unlike a sales or property
tax, or any other cost attributable to generating income taxable by X,
Y's net income tax is levied on income that has already been appor-
tioned to Y. That income is not taxable by X and, thus, Y's franchise
tax is properly characterized as a cost attributable to generating income
that is exempt from taxation by X. Accordingly, in calculating its net
income for purposes of X's tax, it is improper for the corporation to
deduct the Y franchise tax. 4 Stated differently, because Y's tax is levied
14 Despite the promulgation of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Pur-
poses Act (UDITPA) and the efforts of the Multistate Tax Commission (see
generally HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10 at 495-98), tax laws vary among states
and State X's law is unlikely to be identical to State Y's law. In some cases, a
corporation might pay taxes to Y on income that X also taxed. In other cases,
the interaction of X's and Y's tax laws might result in a corporation paying no
tax at all on some portion of its income. The only way to eliminate completely
this lack of harmonization is for the states to adopt uniform rules for the tax-
ation of corporations. The deduction for income taxes paid to other states is not
a principled solution to the problem of nonuniformity in state tax laws.
It is conceivable that X's law and Y's law might interact in a determinate and
sytematic manner that ensured that a corporation would pay Y tax on income
that State X also taxed. In this circumstance, State X would have to weigh the
advantages of granting a deduction for the Y tax against the administrative
burdens and loss of revenue that would result. The granting of a deduction
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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on income only after it has already been apportioned, no reason exists to
apportion the Y tax a second time, which would be the result if the tax
were also allowed as a deduction in calculating the corporation's net
income apportioned to X. 15
Allowing a deduction for income taxes paid to other states can intro-
duce horizontal inequities into a state income tax, as illustrated by the
following examples:
Example 1: Compare a corporation that is doing business in both
States X and Y with an intrastate corporation that has property, payroll
and receipts only in State X. Assume that both corporations have $1,000
of net income determined without any deduction for income taxes and
that both X and Y have identical income taxes levied at a 10% rate and
do not allow a deduction for income taxes. Assume, further, that the
multistate corporation apportions 25% of its income to X and 75% of
might have an additional hidden cost if it undercut long-term efforts to harmo-
nize X and Y law. At best, however, a deduction should be granted not for all
of the Y tax but for only that part imposed on income that State X also taxed.
State X should be unwilling to grant a partial deduction if the lack of harmoni-
zation arose because Y adopted an idiosyncratic method of taxation. An analogy
exists with respect to the U.S. foreign tax credit, which is intended to harmonize
the U.S. income tax with that of foreign countries. The credit is denied for
foreign taxes that deviate too widely from U.S. concepts of an income tax. See
Reg. § 1.901-2.
15 As another application of the analysis in the text, consider capital stock
taxes. These taxes are typically levied on the amount of a corporation's appor-
tioned capital stock and can be viewed as a crude form of a wealth or property
tax. A capital stock tax imposed by Y is no less a cost of generating income that
is taxable by X than is a property tax imposed by Y on the corporation's factory.
For this reason, the fact that a capital stock tax is usually levied on the amount
of capital apportioned to a state is irrelevant; the relevant question is whether
the capital stock upon which the tax was levied was used in producing income
taxable by X. Accordingly, Y's capital stock tax should be properly deductible
in calculating X's income tax if such capital stock was used in producing income
taxable by X.
Some states require a corporation to pay the higher of a capital stock tax or a
net income tax. See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAw § 210(1)(a) (McKinney 1966). A
capital stock tax that is paid under these circumstances can be viewed as consist-
ing of two components: (1) an income tax equal to the amount that would have
been paid if the state had only a net income tax; and (2) a capital stock tax,
equal in amount to the excess of the tax that was actually paid over the income
tax component described in (1). Theoretically, a deduction should be denied for
only the income tax component. Administratively, however, this approach might
be difficult to police and a state might decide to deny a deduction in situations
where the corporation paid the higher of a capital stock tax or an income tax.
Of the 27 states that deny a deduction for corporate income taxes paid to other
states, four extend the prohibition to include capital stock taxes. See MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 30(5) (b) (iii) (West 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-
A:4(VII) (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-7(3)(d) (1953; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 71.04(3) (West 1966).
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its income to Y and that the intrastate corporation apportions 100%
of its income to X. Both corporations have the same total net income
and both corporations are subject to identical 10% income tax laws.
Accordingly, both corporations would be expected to pay in the aggre-
gate $100 (10% X $1,000) in state income taxes. If no deduction is
allowed for income taxes, this result is achieved. The multistate corpora-
tion pays $75 in State Y tax ($1,000 X 75% X 10%) and $25 in
State X tax ($1,000 X 25% X 10%), or $100 in the aggregate
($75 + $25). The intrastate corporation also pays $100 in tax
(10% X $1,000), all to State X.
If one or both states allow a deduction for the other's income tax,
however, the multistate corporation will pay less than the intrastate cor-
poration as Example 2 illustrates.
Example 2: If, under the facts above, State X were to allow a deduc-
tion for the Y tax while Y continues to disallow a deduction for income
taxes paid to other states, the multistate corporation's taxable income un-
der X law would be $925 ($1,000 -- $75), $231 of which would be
apportioned to X ($925 X 25%), generating a State X tax of $23
($231 X 10% ). The multistate corporation would continue to pay $75
in State Y tax but it would now pay only $98 in the aggregate ($23 tc
X and $75 to Y) because of the reduction in its X tax. More precisely,
the multistate corporation is taxed by X at an effective rate of tax, de-
fined as the X tax divided by the corporation's apportioned net income
calculated without any deduction for income taxes paid to other states
which is lower than the effective rate of tax paid by the intrastate cor-
poration. This difference in effective tax rates is further illustrated in
Example 3.
Example 3: Consider two corporations, an intrastate corporation
that has $250 of net income, all of which is apportioned to State X, and
a multistate corporation that apportions $250 of net income to X and
$750 of net income to Y.11 Net income is calculated without any de-
duction for income taxes. Assume that States X and Y have identical
10% corporate income taxes that do not allow a deduction for income
taxes. Both the multistate and the intrastate corporations have the same
income apportioned to State X and both corporations would be ex-
pected to pay the same amount of X tax. If no deduction is allowed by
X for State Y's income tax, this result is achieved. The multistate cor-
poration pays $25 in X tax ($1,000 X 25% X 10%) as does the
intrastate corporation ($250 X 10% ). Both corporations pay the same
10% effective rate of X tax ($25/$250). Parity is maintained between
16 For ease of presentation, both corporations are assumed to have the same
amount of net income apportioned to X. This assumption is relaxed in Example
4, infra.
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the multistate and the intrastate corporation. If, however, State X
allowed a deduction for the Y income tax of $75, the multistate corpo-
ration's X tax would be only $23.11 The multistate corporation's effec-
tive rate of X tax would be reduced from 10% to 9.2% ($23/$250).
It should be apparent from Example 3 that the larger the amount of
income taxes paid to Y, the lower the effective rate of X tax paid by the
multistate corporation. To illustrate, if, in Example 3, Y were to in-
crease its tax rate to 15%, the multistate corporation's effective rate of
X tax would be reduced to 8.8% 18 Moreover, the lower the multistate
corporation's business apportionment percentage in X, the lower its ef-
fective rate of X tax, because as the corporation reduces its business
apportionment percentage in X, it is substituting a tax that is deductible
(the Y tax) for one that is not (the X tax). This relationship is illus-
trated in Example 4.
Example 4: Change the first set of facts in Example 3 so that the mul-
tistate corporation has a business apportionment percentage in X of
5% and a business apportionment percentage in Y of 95%. Accord-
ingly, the multistate corporation apportions $50 of net income to X and
$950 of net income to Y. If X allows a deduction for the Y tax, the
multistate corporation would pay an effective rate of X tax of 9.05%,11
which is less than the 9.2% effective tax rate that it paid in Example 3
when it had a higher business apportionment percentage.
The relationships illustrated in Examples 1-4 can be expressed mathe-
matically. Under the two-state model used in the above examples, the
effective rate of X income tax can be expressed as:
BAPx (I- Y) Rx
BAPx (I)
Where BAPx - business apportionment percentage in X;
I - a corporation's pre-apportionment net income
calculated without any deduction for income taxes paid to other states:
Y = income tax paid to State Y;
Rx - nominal rate of X income tax.
17 $1,000 - $75 = $925; $925 x 25% = $231; $231 x 10% = $23.
Is $1,000 x 75% = $750 of net income apportioned to Y; $750 X 15% =
$112.50 of Y tax.
The X tax is $22 computed as follows: $1,000-$112.50 = $887.50 of net in-
come; $887.50 X 25% = $221.88 of net income apportioned to X; $221.88 X
10% = $22 of X tax. This is an effective rate of X tax of 8.8% ($22/$250).
19 $1,000 x 95% = $950 of net income apportioned to Y; $950 X 10% =
$95 of Y tax. The X tax is $4.53 computed as follows: $1,000 - $95 = $905
of net income; $905 x 5% = $45.25 of net income apportioned to X; $45.25 X
10% = $4.53 of X tax. This is an effective rate of X tax of 9.05% ($4.53/$50).
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The effective rate of X income tax can be rewritten as:
(I - Y) Rx
I
As Y increases, the effective rate of X income tax decreases. As a cor-
poration apportions more income to State Y, Y will increase and thus
the effective rate of X income tax will decrease.
The same approach can be used to generalize about the effective rate
of X tax if a corporation is taxable in two (or more) other states. For
example, assume a corporation is taxable in States X, Y and Z. Assume
further that only X allows a deduction for income taxes paid to other
states and that each state has a different tax rate-Rx, R., and Rz. Aside
from these differences, the states have the same rules for determining
net income and the business apportionment percentage. Under these
conditions, the effective rate of X tax can be expressed as:
BAPx (I - Y - Z) Rx
BAPx (I)
The Y income tax can be expressed as:
BAPY (I) (RY)
Similarly, the Z income tax can be expressed as:
BAP (i) (Rz).
Substituting these values for Y and Z, the effective rate of X income tax
can be rewritten as follows:
[I- (BAPY) (I) (Rr) - (BAPz) (I) (Rz)] Rx
I
Rx [1 - (BAPr Rr + BAPz Rz)]
As in the two-state case, a multistate corporation will still pay an effec-
tive rate of X tax lower than an intrastate corporation having a 100%
business apportionment percentage because the former will have a de-
duction for income taxes paid to other states that the latter will not
Also, the multistate corporation's effective tax rate in X will still be
reduced as the amount of taxes it pays to other states increases.
Unlike the two-state case, however, a decrease in the multistate cor-
poration's business apportionment percentage in X will not necessarily
increase the amount of taxes that it pays to other states. As a corpora-
tion's business apportionment percentage in X decreases, whether its
effective rate of X tax increases or decreases is a function of the way its
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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income is apportioned to States Y and Z and of their respective tax
rates. If the business apportionment percentage in X decreases because
income is shifted only from X to either Y or Z, the effective rate of X
tax will decrease. But if the shift from X is accompanied by shifts be-
tween Y and Z, the effective rate of X tax could stay the same, increase
or decrease.20
The preceding discussion provides a convenient shift in focus to com-
paring the effective tax rate on multistate corporations. The previous
emphasis in this article has been on comparing an intrastate corporation
having a business apportionment percentage of 100% with a multistat
corporation. This emphasis should not obscure the horizontal inequity
that exists in the taxation of multistate corporations when a state allow.
a deduction for income taxes paid to other states. Because of the deduc
tion, a corporation's effective tax rate in a state allowing the deduction
is dependent on the amount of income taxes paid to other states. Multi-
state corporations obviously pay different amounts of such income taxes
and thus their effective tax rates will vary. The analysis in this article
could have proceeded, without any difference in conclusion, by starting
with the horizontal inequity that exists among multistate corporations
and finishing with the intrastate corporation, treating that situation as
the limiting case in which a corporation's out-of-state income approaches
zero.
The suggestion has sometimes been made that the inequities identifie
above would be eliminated if a state were to grant a deduction for both
its own income tax as well as those paid to other states.21 Whether a
state should allow a deduction for its own income tax, however, is un-
related to whether it should allow a deduction for income taxes paid to
other states.
The granting by a state of a deduction for its own tax can be
viewed as either a question involving the rate of tax or a question in-
20 To illustrate, consider a corporation taxable in States X, Y and Z. Assume
that the X, Y and Z nominal tax rates are 10%, 5%, and 15% respectively.
Assume further that a multistate corporation initially apportions 50% of its net
income to X, 10% of its net income to Y, and 40% of its net income to Z. Its
effective rate of X tax is .0935 (.10 [1 - (.10 x .05 + .40 X .15)] = .0935.)
If the corporation shifts income only from X to either Y or Z, its effective rate
of X tax will decrease because it will be substituting a tax that is deductible
(either Y's tax or Z's tax) for a tax that is not deductible (X's tax). For ex-
ample, assume that the corporation now apportions 10% of its income to X,
50% of its income to Y, and 40% of its income to Z. Its effective rate of X tax
would decrease to .0915 (.10 [1 - (.50 x .05 + .40 x .15] = .0915.)
Suppose, however, that the shift of income out of X is accompanied by a shift
of income out of Z so that while the corporation apportions 10% of its income
to X, it now apportions 80% of its income to Y and 10% of its income to Z. Its
effective rate of X tax would then not decrease to .0915 but rather would increase
to .0945 (.10 [1 - (.80 X .05 + .10 X .15] = .0945.)
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volving the definition of net income. For example, a 10% income tax
calculated without a deduction for the tax itself is equivalent to an
11.11% tax calculated with such a deduction. That is, a corporation
with $100 of apportioned net income (determined without any deduction
for income taxes paid to other states) would pay $10 in tax under either
approach: 10% X $100 if a deduction were denied, or 11.11% X $90
= $10 if a deduction were allowed. If a deduction were allowed, the
corporation would determine its tax, T, through the following formula:
(100 - T) .1111 -T;
11.11 - .1111T T;
11.11 = 1.1111T;
T= 10.
Because a state's own tax is a cost of generating income that is taxable
only in that state, it is proper that the deduction be allowed against
income after it has been apportioned.
Computationally, denying a deduction is simpler than allowing a de-
duction against apportioned net income and has the added advantage of
providing a lower nominal tax rate. Presumably, one or both of these
reasons explain why the federal corporate and personal income taxes
and most state personal and corporate income taxes deny such a de-
duction.22 The question of which approach a state should adopt-
allowing or denying a deduction for its own tax-is independent of, and
therefore cannot resolve the issue of, whether a deduction should be
granted for income taxes paid to other states.2
21 See, e.g., Draft Memorandum from the Business Council of New York
State to the author (undated); Letter from H. Thomas Platt, Director of Taxes,
Agway, Inc., to the author (June 19, 1984).22 As enacted in 1913, the federal personal income allowed a deduction for the
income tax itself. See Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 11(B), 38 Stat. 167 (1913). The
deduction was eliminated in 1917 because it was viewed as an unnecessary com-
putational complexity. "It is a pure matter of expediency. If you so arrange the
income tax this year that you allow those who pay it to take back a third of it
next year, you have simply got to put on a bigger tax." 73 CoNG. REc. 6324
(1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis); see C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDucrioNs IN THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67 (1960); Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and
Subsidies, 16 J. L. & ECON. 193, 201 (1973).
2 Seven states allow a deduction for their own income tax. All of these states
allow the deduction in calculating net income prior to apportionment rather than
allowing the deduction against net income after it has been apportioned. See
ARizONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1121 (1956); HAw. REv. STAT. § 235-1 (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734.04 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2A-2 (1978);
Ormo REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.04 (Baldwin 1980); Omx.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 2358 (West Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5811 (1981). With the exception
of Arizona, these states all allow a deduction for income taxes paid to other
states.
Under one specific set of assumptions, the deduction of a state's own franchise
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III. CONCLUSION
A state that grants a deduction for income taxes paid to other states
introduces horizonal inequities into its income tax. Intrastate corpora-
tions having business apportionment percentages of 100% are subject
to effective tax rates in excess of those applied to multistate corpora-
tions. Multistate corporations are subject to effective tax rates that are
higher or lower than those applied to other multistate corporations. In
addition, the deduction causes a state to suffer an unwarranted loss of
revenue.
Despite the logic in denying a deduction for income taxes paid to
other states, why have 40% of the jurisdictions with corporate income
taxes adopted a contrary rule? The lack of complete legislative histories
make it difficult to draw any precise inferences, but the experience of
New York suggests a plausible scenario. For administrative reasons,
New York, like other states, uses a corporation's federal taxable income
tax, as well as those paid to other states, in calculating a corporation's net in-
come prior to apportionment, will produce uniform effective tax rates and thus
eliminate all horizontal inequities. This result is achieved if all the states have
identical taxes and rates. In that situation, the amount of taxes paid in the ag-
gregate is independent of the apportionment of income. A dollar of income
apportioned to the taxing state - X - will generate the same tax as a dollar
apportioned outside the state. All corporations will deduct the same percentage
of their net incomes and, thus, pay the same effective tax rate.
To illustrate, assume a corporation is taxable in States X, Y, and Z, which
have identical laws and rates, R. The tax it pays to State X can be expressed as:
X = BAPx [(I - X - Y - Z)] R
Because states X, Y and Z have identical income taxes imposed at a rate R,
Y = X (BAPy/BAPx)
Z = X (BAPz/BAPx)
and BAPX + BAPy + BAPz = 1
The expression for X can be rewritten as:
X= BAPx I - X - X BAP +  BAP R
I BAP., BAP,)
X = [(BAPx ) I - BAPx (X) - X (1 - BAPx)] R
X = [(BAPx) (I) - X] R
x = (BAPx) (I) (R)
I+R
The effective rate of X tax =
(BAIx) (I) R
(1 + R) (BAYP) (I)
R
1+R
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as the starting point in defining its own corporate tax base.2 By adopt-
ing the federal definition of taxable income, which, in the context of the
federal corporate income tax, properly allows a corporation to deduct
its state and local taxes, New York automatically incorporates a similar
deduction into its laws. The onus is then on the legislature to act affirma-
tively to deny a deduction for its own tax and those paid to other states.
From the inception of its corporate income tax in 1917 2 until 1961,
New York did not take such action and thus allowed a corporation to
deduct all state and local taxes. In 1961, the Legislature denied a de-
duction for the New York tax."  This change was in response to a
recommendation by a tax study committee, which noted the general
pattern that "statutes imposing taxes measured by income usually pro-
hibit such deductions of tax payments made under the same statute." 2
No reference was made to the deductibility of income taxes paid to other
states. According to a member of the committee, "[n]o one raised the
issue of income taxes paid to other states because we assumed they were
legitimate costs of doing business." --2
Having decided to deny a deduction for its own franchise tax, New
York, like many other states, took no further action, with the effect that
income taxes paid to other states remained deductible.*" Other states,
however, might have balked at denying a deduction for their own taxes
while allowing a deduction for those paid alsewhere."0 Although the
The effective rate of X tax is thus independent of the apportionment of income
and is the same for all corporations.
24 N.Y. TAX LAw § 208(9) (McKinney 1966).
2 5 Pub. L. No. 65-726, 42 Stat. 473 (1917).
26 Pub. L. No. 86-713, 86 Stat. 1204 (1961).
27 HuRD, MCHUGH, & MURPHY, INTERIM REPORT OF NEW YORK STATE TAx
STRUCTURE COMMrrEE 82 (1960).
28 Conversation between the author and Joseph H. Murphy (Oct. 16, 1985).
29 States that deny a deduction for their own franchise tax but allow a deduc-
tion for those paid to other states are: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-
2016(c)) (1980); Colorado (CoLO. REv. STAT. § 39-22-304 (1982); Connecti-
cut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217 (West 1958)); Delaware (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 30, § 1903 (1985)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(f)
(Smith-Hurd 1974)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 422.35 (West 1971); Louisiana
(LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:55 (West 1970)); New Jersey (NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:10A-4(k) (West 1940)); New York (N.Y. TAx LAw § 208 (McKinney
1966)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-11-11 (1956)); Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. § 67-4-805 (1983)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 11-24-6
(1983)).
Apparently, the issue of denying a deduction for franchise taxes paid to other
states was never debated in New York before being proposed by the Tax Study
Commission. See REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE N.Y. TAX STUDY CoMIMISSION,
THE ARTICLE 9-A FRANCHISE TAX: THE DEDUCTION FOR CORPORATION INCOME
TAXES PAID TO OTHER STATES (1984).
30 This reasoning apparently led Pennsylvania to deny a deduction for fran-
chise taxes paid to other states. Telephone interview with J.M. Bodfish, Director,
Taxes, United States Steel Corporation (Feb. 10, 1986). Revenue considerations
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treatment of a state's own tax is independent of its treatment of taxes
paid to other states,3 superficially, the issues appear similar. Conse-
quently, it is possible that denying a deduction for income taxes paid to
other states was never fully debated, but was seen as a logical conse-
quence of a decision to deny the deduction of the state's own tax.
Of course, notwithstanding the lack of relevant legislative histories, it is
also possible that states were influenced by normative considerations.
In any event, states that deny a deduction for income taxes paid to sister
states-whatever the motivating factors-have adopted a principled
position that should be adopted by jurisdictions having contrary
approaches.
might also influence a legislature to deny a deduction for franchise taxes paid
to other states. The author understands that revenue considerations influenced
both Wisconsin and Florida to deny such a deduction.
31 See supra text accompanying note 23.
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